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Abstract
Interdependencies are ubiquitous throughout the world. Every real-world system interacts with
and is dependent on other systems, and this interdependency affects their performance. In par-
ticular, interdependencies among networks make them vulnerable to failure cascades, the effects
of which are often catastrophic. Failure propagation fragments network components, disconnects
them, and may cause complete systemic failure. We propose a strategy of avoiding or at least
mitigating the complete destruction of a system of interdependent networks experiencing a failure
cascade. Starting with a fraction 1− p of failing nodes in one network, we reconnect with a prob-
ability γ every isolated component to a functional giant component (GC), the largest connected
cluster. We find that as γ increases the resilience of the system to cascading failure also increases.
We also find that our strategy is more effective when it is applied in a network of low average
degree. We solve the problem theoretically using percolation theory, and we find that the solution
agrees with simulation results.
PACS numbers: 64.60.aq; 64.60.ah; 89.75.-k
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I. INTRODUCTION
Interdependence is a characteristic of the world in which we live. We see this in such
infrastructure networks as transportation systems, electrical power grids, natural gas and
water systems, telephone systems, and the Internet. Thus, transportation networks depend
on petroleum supplies and electrical power, the Internet on electrical power, and the control
of natural gas and water systems on telecommunications. Interdependencies among networks
can produce new systemic behaviors not seen in isolated networks, and these interdepen-
dencies can both enhance network functioning or increase its vulnerability to catastrophic
failure. For example, a transportation network can increase the propagation rate of a disease
epidemic, and if the network includes airlines the propagation can become world-wide.
We see a catastrophic example of interdependence in the after-effects of Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 [1–3]. Several oil rigs and refineries were destroyed and this paralyzed oil and gas
extractions for a number of months. This caused the price of fuel to rise exponentially, and
this affected the airlines. Forest devastation affected the Mississippi logging industry, and
there was a sharp drop in activity in the ports of Southern Louisiana and New Orleans, two
of the largest in the EEUU. In addition to the thousands of homes that were destroyed, the
loss of thousands of jobs meant that many owners of homes who had survived the hurricane
were no longer able to pay their mortgages. Some insurance companies, because of the huge
indemnities they had to face, either increased their homeowner fees or stopped insuring in the
area altogether. It is thus clear that we need to understand how real-world interdependencies
function. We need to know how to prevent, avoid, or mitigate the catastrophic failures they
can magnify because interdependencies are everywhere.
Interdependent systems have recently been treated as networks of networks (NoN), i.e.,
systems in which two or more networks interact, and they have been successfully used
to understand epidemic spreading [4–8], failure cascades [7–11], diffusion [7, 8, 12, 13],
and synchronization [7, 14–17]. We characterize single networks in terms of their internal
degree distribution P (k), which is the probability that a node is connected to k, with
kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax, where kmin and kmax are the minimum and maximum connectivities
in the network, respectively. The interdependence between networks involves “external”
dependency links that connect nodes in one network to nodes in a second network. These
dependency links can strongly affect system robustness and can facilitate such catastrophic
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events as failure cascades [7–11, 18] in which a node failure in one network propagates
through dependency links and causes nodes in the other network to also fail. This occurred
in the power outage in Italy on 28 September 2003. The shutdown of some power stations
caused nodes in the communication network to fail, which in turn caused breakdowns in
additional power stations [19].
In a model introduced by Buldyrev et al. [18] the authors studied the cascade failures in
two interdependent networks by mapping the process as random node percolation, a process
that is very important due to its ubiquitous application in failure cascades and the spread of
disease. In random node percolation a fraction 1−p of nodes fail and the network fragments
into clusters. The network remains functional if there is still a connected giant component
(GC). The finite clusters remaining are considered dysfunctional. In the Buldyrev model
nodes in the first network depend one-to-one on nodes in the second network. At the initial
stage a fraction 1 − p of nodes and all finite clusters are removed from the first network
and, as a consequence, all the interdependent nodes in the second network also fail. At each
time step we remove all finite clusters and their interdependent nodes in the other network
until the system reaches the state in which there are no remaining finite clusters. If both
networks still have functional clusters in this final “steady” state, they are of the same size
and all their nodes are supported by nodes in the opposite network. They found a threshold
pc at which all functional components disappear. This threshold is higher than in isolated
networks that have the same degree distribution, which implies that a NoN is less robust
than isolated networks. More important is the nature of the phase transition characterized
by the order parameter P∞(p) (the relative size of the GC), which is first order while in
isolated networks it is of second order [20]. In a first order transition the GCs overcome an
abrupt transition from a finite value to zero at pc and, as a consequence, it is more difficult
to forecast or control the transition than in isolated networks.
After this pioneering work, many studies focused on modeling mitigation strategies of
preventing the drastic consequences of the first order phase transition, such as autonomizing
a fraction q of nodes [9, 21–26]. Nevertheless, it is difficult and expensive to autonomize
nodes in real NoN because their infrastructure were constructed not at random, but instead
by economic reasons in order to accomplish efficiently some tasks. Recently Di Muro et al.
[27] proposed a node recovery strategy in a system of interdependent networks that repairs,
with probability γ, a fraction of failed nodes that are neighbors of the largest connected
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the implementation of the strategy in network B. The blue cluster represents
the functional component (GC). a) the green clusters represent the saved clusters and in red the
clusters that could not be saved. The dashed lines represent the free links available to use for the
reconnection of the finite clusters. b) The new GC of network B.
component in each network. They found that for a given initial failure of a fraction 1 − p
of nodes, there is a threshold probability of recovery above which the cascade stops and the
system is restored to its initial state and below which the system abruptly collapses. They
found three distinct phases: one in which the system never collapses without being restored,
a second in which the recovery strategy avoids collapse, and a third in which the repairing
process cannot prevent the collapse of the system. However, it is not always possible to
repair the components of a network, and sometimes the repairing process requires so much
time and so many resources that the system suffers total breakdown before it is completed.
Thus, in this work we propose and study another strategy for preventing total network
destruction after a failure cascade is initiated. The strategy is to save finite clusters prior
to their failure by connecting them to the functional network component (GC).
II. MODEL AND SIMULATIONS
Using the process proposed by Buldyrev et al. [18] we model and use a strategy for
mitigating a cascade as it begins. We consider two interdependent networks A and B with
the same size N and with degree distributions PA(k) and PB(k), respectively. We use the
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Molloy-Reed algorithm [28], disallowing self loops and multiple connections, to construct
each network. The interdependency between A and B we assume to be one-to-one, i.e., each
node has only one dependency link. We apply the strategy only to network B—although it
could be applied to either network—because the cascading is so rapid that we must choose
a network in which applying the strategy is easier, such as a communication network, which
is faster and less expensive to operate than a power grid.
At step n = 0 we remove a fraction 1 − p of nodes in network A and locate its GC. We
then remove all nodes in A that belong to finite clusters, assuming that they have become
dysfunctional due to lack of support, and we remove their interdependent nodes in B. We
then apply the strategy of locating the GC in B and reconnecting to it every finite cluster
in the same network with a probability γ (See Fig. 1). We do this by connecting two nodes
in each existing finite cluster (clusters bigger than one node) with the GC. Single nodes we
connect using one connection. We select two nodes rather than one when reconnecting to
reduce the probability that the finite cluster will again disconnect from the GC. Note that
although increasing the number of connected nodes increases network resilience, a greater
number of connections requires greater economic resources, and cascading can be so rapid
we are unable to achieve many reconnections. Note also that in order to preserve the initial
degree distribution, the nodes we choose to reconnect must have free links, i.e., links that at
earlier stages were connected to nodes that were already removed (dashed links in Fig. 1).
This assumption allows us to map our model directly using node percolation theory. We
assume that the clusters that are finite prior to the failure cascade will fail because they
have no saveable free links.
The initial stage n = 0 ends when we remove with a probability 1− γ the finite clusters
in B that cannot be saved [red nodes in Fig. 1(a)]. Stage n = 1 begins when we propagate
the failure from B back to A and remove all failed dependent nodes in B. We iterate this
procedure until the system reaches the final “steady” state in which there are no remaining
finite clusters. We denote by P α∞ the relative size of the GC in network α, with α = A,B.
Note that because nodes in one network depend one-to-one on nodes in the other network
at the steady state, PA∞ = P
B
∞ = P∞. For the simulations we use an Erdo¨s Re´ny (ER)
random graph characterized by a Poisson degree distribution given by P (k) = e−〈k〉〈k〉k/k!,
where 〈k〉 represents the average degree of the network, and a scale-free (SF) with cutoff
with degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−λexp(−k/β), where λ is the broadness of the distribution
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FIG. 2: P∞ as a function of p for γ = 0 (©), γ = 0.1 (), γ = 0.5 (⋄), γ = 0.9 (△) and γ = 1 (+)
for a) two ER, with 〈k〉 = 8 b) two SF with λ = 2.5 and β = 20, and the combination of the two
kind of network ER and SF applying the strategy in c) SF and d) ER. The dashed curves represent
the theory.
and β is the cutoff in the connectivity. For all simulations all networks have N = 106 nodes,
with a maximum connectivity kmax = 20 and 〈k〉 = 8 for the ER and λ = 2.5, kmin = 2 and
kmax = N
1/2 [29–31] with β = 20 for the SF.
Figure 2 plots P∞ at the steady state as a function of p for different values of γ. Note
that for γ = 0 we recover the results of Ref. [18], i.e., we obtain a first-order transition in
which P∞ jumps from a finite value to zero at pc. As γ increases the threshold pc decreases.
This allows to the system to overcome a high level of damage before the two functional
components collapse. There is still a first-order transition, but the jump in the relative size
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of the GC decreases as γ increases. Only when γ = 1 is there a continuous second-order
transition. Note that the effect of the strategy is stronger in networks with a low average
connectivity, such as for the SF networks which have an average degree 〈k〉 = 3.08. Networks
with a low average degree (the two SF) are more likely to fragment, which makes the system
more vulnerable to failure cascades. Here and when γ = 0 the system is completely destroyed
when 20 percent of its nodes fail, but using the strategy the system can sustain a higher
level of damage before it collapses. The best value is γ = 1. Here the system fails only when
80 percent of its nodes fail.
When the two networks are different our strategy continues to increase systemic resilience
to failure cascades, since the value of pc decreases as γ increases. Note also that the best
outcome occurs when the strategy is applied to the more fragile network—the one with the
lowest average degree—in our case the SF network. Note also that when γ = 0.5 the ER-SF
case with the strategy applied to the SF network has a pc smaller than the SF-ER case with
the strategy applied to the ER network. When we do not use the strategy (γ = 0), the pc is
the same for both cases and is unaffected by which network initiates the failure. However as
γ increases the pc for ER-SF and SF-ER cases increasingly differ, because it is more efficient
to apply the strategy to the more fragile network, which fragments more easily and in which
unsaved finite clusters ultimately fail.
III. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Theoretically the cascading failure problem can be solved using node percolation [18, 32].
In isolated networks we compute the relative size of the GC after removing a fraction 1− µ
of nodes by solving the self-consistent equation for probability f . Choosing an edge of the
network at random leads to a node connected to the GC, where f is
f = µ(1−G1(1− f)) , (1)
where G1(x) =
∑kmax
k=kmin
kP (k)/〈k〉xk−1 is the generating function of the excess degree dis-
tribution [32, 33], 〈k〉 is the average degree of the network, and µ is the effective fraction of
remaining nodes. Thus the fraction of nodes in the GC is
P∞(µ) = µ(1−G0(1− f)) , (2)
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where G0(x) =
∑kmax
k=kmin
P (k)xk is the generating function of the degree distribution [32, 33].
For two interdependent networks, we start the cascading at stage n = 0 by removing a
fraction 1 − p of nodes in network A (µA(0) = p) and a corresponding fraction SA(0) =
µA(0) − P
A
∞(0) of nodes in the finite clusters. The failure spreads to network B through
interdependency links, thus µB(0) = P
A
∞(0) and the fraction of nodes in the finite clusters in
B is given by SB(0) = µB(0)−P
B
∞(0). The next stage begins when the failure SB(0) of nodes
in network B returns to network A. For any step n in the cascading, the stage begins when
a fraction SB(n−1) of nodes fail in the GC of network A (P
A
∞(n−1)), which corresponds to
the fraction of nodes belonging to finite clusters in B at step n− 1. Then the total fraction
of nodes that fails in network A at step n is µA(n− 1)SB(n− 1)/P
A
∞(n− 1) and µA(n) is
µA(n) = µA(n− 1)
[
1−
SB(n− 1)
PA∞(n− 1)
]
. (3)
Thus we obtain PA∞(n) using Eqs. (1) and (2), and the fraction of nodes that belongs to the
finite clusters as a consequence of the fragmentation of PA∞(n− 1) is
SA(n) = P
B
∞(n− 1)− P
A
∞(n) . (4)
Following the same procedure as in network A, we obtain
µB(n) = µB(n− 1)
[
1−
SA(n)
PB∞(n− 1)
]
, (5)
SB(n) = P
A
∞(n)− P
B
∞(n) , (6)
where PB∞(n) is derived using Eqs. (1) and (2). The process continues until the system
reaches the steady state in which there are no finite clusters in either network SA = SB = 0
and both GCs are of the same size PA∞ = P
B
∞.
The strategy is applied after the failure in A propagates to B and just prior to its return to
A. We now save with a probability γ each finite cluster in B. Even when finite clusters have
differing sizes and probabilities of existing, we assume that on average we save a fraction
γSB of nodes at each time step because the probability γ of saving each finite cluster is
independent of its size (its number of nodes). We begin at stage n in network A with failure
(1−γ)SB(n−1), which corresponds to the finite clusters in B that could not be saved during
the previous step. Thus we rewrite Eq. (3) to be
µA(n) = µA(n− 1)
[
1−
(1− γ)SB(n− 1)
PA∞(n− 1)
]
. (7)
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FIG. 3: NOI as a function of p from the theory for a) γ = 0 and b) γ = 0.5. Both cases are for
two ER (black), two SF (red), ER-SF (green) and SF-ER (blue), always applying the strategy in
B (A−B). Notice that in a) the green curve represents the two cases ER-SF and SF-ER because
without strategy the cascading failure is the same.
The cascading process evolves following Eqs. (4), (5), and (6), with Eqs. (1) and (2). We
apply our strategy and save a fraction of nodes γSB(n). Then the fraction of nodes belonging
to the new GC in B is
PB∞(n) = P
B
∞(n) + γSB(n) , (8)
and using Eqs. (1) and (2) we obtain the new fraction of nodes µB(n). The process continues
until the system reaches the steady state at which P
A/B
∞ < ǫ, where ǫ = 1/N is related to
finite size effects. We iterate this theoretical process numerically.
Figure 2 compares the simulation results (symbols) with the theoretical results (dashed
line). Note that both agree. Only when γ values are close to 1 and near pc do the simulation
results differ slightly from the theoretical results. To explain this we compute theoretically
the number of iterations (NOI) or stages required for the system to reach the steady state
(see Fig. 3). We can see that the NOI generates a sharp peak at the critical threshold. The
system requires many time steps to reach the steady state when p is close to pc. When p
moves away from pc, only a few time steps are needed for the system to reach the steady
state. The internal structures of the two new GCs in B (from simulation and theory) differ
after we apply the strategy. After a few steps they remain similar at the steady state for
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values of p far from pc. With internal structure we are referencing to the number and form
in which are made the internal connections of each GC. Note that theoretically we obtain
a new GC and the internal connections change, but in the simulations we only add two
new connections to each saved finite cluster. For values of p close to pc the NOI increases
exponentially and the difference between both GCs increases. Finally the deviation becomes
less noticeable as we move away from γ = 1 and near pc where the NOI is high. This is
the case because the probability of saving any finite cluster decreases as γ decreases, which
means that only a few nodes are saved and the restructuring of the GC is slight.
Figure 4 plots the phase diagram in the plane γ-p for the same cases as in Fig. 2: (a)
two ER with 〈k〉 = 8, (b) two SF with 〈k〉 = 3.08, and combinations of (c) ER-SF and
(d) SF-ER where the strategy is always applied to network B (A – B). The vertical line
(dashed) is the pc for γ = 0. To the right of the dashed line in Regime I the system remains
functional, even when the strategy is not applied. The middle region, Regime II, is the zone
in which the strategy is needed to avoid the total destruction of the system. Note that this
region is much larger when the networks have a low average degree, e.g., the two SF with
〈k〉 = 3.08. Figure 4(b) (inset) plots the phase diagram for two SF with 〈k〉 = 8 (kmin = 5).
Note that the plot is similar to the one in Fig. 4(a). Networks with a low average degree
have nodes with fewer connections, which means that they are more prone to fragmentation
and more likely to fail completely. Figures 4(c) and 4(d) show that in ER-SF and SF-ER
Regime II is broader in ER-SF, and we are more able to save the system when the strategy
is applied to fragile networks, i.e., those with a low average degree. This can be seen more
clearly in Fig. 3(b) where for the same γ the pc is higher (blue curve) when the strategy is
applied to the less fragile network (ER). As mentioned above, the network with the lower
average degree is more prone to fragmentation, and its finite clusters ultimately fail. It is
thus important to apply the strategy to the more fragile network with the lower average
degree. Finally the continuous curve represents the γc values below which the networks are
completely destroyed (Regime III). We obtain this curve theoretically from the peaks in the
NOI (see Fig. 3 for different γ values).
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram in the plane γ − p from the theory for a) two ER with 〈k〉 = 8, b) two SF
with 〈k〉 = 3.08 and the combination of and ER and SF networks applying the strategy in c) SF
and d) ER. The continuous curve represents the value of γc below which the system is completely
destroyed and the dashed line represents pc for the case γ = 0. In the inset of b) we plot the case
for two SF, but with kmin = 5 (〈k〉 = 8). Notice that the plot is very similar to the two ER case.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a strategy for avoiding the complete destruction of a system of two
interdependent networks. We define network interconnections to be interdependent links
connecting each node in the first network with its counterpart in the second. We apply
our strategy to one network and prior to their failure and with probability γ save every
finite cluster by connecting two of their nodes to the GC. We find that the system becomes
11
increasingly robust to cascading failure as γ increases, and that the strategy is most effective
when it is applied to the network with the lower average degree. We solve the problem
theoretically using percolation theory and we find an agreement with the simulation results.
In future work we will study the implementation of the strategy in systems larger than
two networks and where network interdependence is given by a degree distribution.
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